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Healthcare workers accounted for a large proportion of
persons with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
during the worldwide epidemic of early 2003. We conduct-
ed an investigation of healthcare workers exposed to labo-
ratory-confirmed SARS patients in the United States to
evaluate infection-control practices and possible SARS-
associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) transmission. We
identified 110 healthcare workers with exposure within
droplet range (i.e., 3 feet) to six SARS-CoV–positive
patients. Forty-five healthcare workers had exposure with-
out any mask use, 72 had exposure without eye protection,
and 40 reported direct skin-to-skin contact. Potential
droplet- and aerosol-generating procedures were infre-
quent: 5% of healthcare workers manipulated a patient’s
airway, and 4% administered aerosolized medication.
Despite numerous unprotected exposures, there was no
serologic evidence of healthcare-related SARS-CoV trans-
mission. Lack of transmission in the United States may be
related to the relative absence of high-risk procedures or
patients, factors that may place healthcare workers at high-
er risk for infection.
T
he epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) quickly spread worldwide in 2003. As of July
11, 2003, a total of 29 countries had reported 8,427 proba-
ble cases to the World Health Organization (1). Much of
the disease worldwide was associated with hospital-based
outbreaks (2,3). Healthcare workers made up a large pro-
portion of cases, accounting for 37%–63% of suspected
SARS cases in highly affected countries (4–6). In the
United States, the epidemic was limited; 74 probable and 8
laboratory-confirmed case-patients were reported, despite
aggressive efforts at detection, particularly in groups at
high risk. Surveillance for symptoms of SARS was recom-
mended for all healthcare workers who were exposed to
patients meeting the clinical case definition for suspected
or probable SARS (7).
Due to the importance of healthcare facilities in trans-
mission of SARS worldwide, state and local health depart-
ments, together with the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), conducted a review of U.S. healthcare
workers exposed to patients positive for SARS-associated
coronavirus (SARS-CoV). Our objectives were to charac-
terize the types of exposures and infection-control prac-
tices that occurred in U.S. hospitals related to SARS
patient care and to determine the extent of SARS-CoV
transmission to U.S. healthcare workers.
Methods
This investigation focused on healthcare workers at
highest risk for infection, in other words, those who had
known unprotected exposure to laboratory-confirmed
SARS-CoV–positive patients. An exposure was defined as
any healthcare worker–patient interaction that occurred
within droplet range (i.e., 3 feet). Exposures were catego-
rized as either unprotected or protected, depending upon
whether full personal protective equipment was used. Full
equipment was defined as the use of all the personal pro-
tective equipment recommended for the care of SARS
patients, i.e., a full-length gown, gloves, N95 or higher res-
pirator, and eye protection with goggles or a face shield
(7,8).
Healthcare workers were identified by hospital infec-
tion-control practitioners and public health officials
through informal interviews with hospital staff, by review
of employee records, and by self-identification. In addition
to the healthcare workers at highest risk, other healthcare
workers of interest were included, such as those with mul-
tiple protected exposures and any who requested inclusion
because of concerns about exposure.
This investigation was conducted as part of the public
health response to the SARS outbreak. Informed consent
was obtained from healthcare workers before epidemio-
logic and clinical information and biologic specimens
were collected. A standardized questionnaire was used to
collect data on demographics, occupation, exposure char-
acteristics, use of personal protective equipment, patient
events to which the healthcare workers were exposed (e.g.,
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cedures. In addition, information was collected regarding
any clinical signs or symptoms in the worker up to 10 days
after exposure, including fever, cough, shortness of breath,
or radiographically confirmed pneumonia. Asingle conva-
lescent-phase serum sample was collected from healthcare
workers at least 28 days after their last exposure to the
patient. In some situations early in the outbreak, samples
were collected between days 22 to 28 early in the outbreak,
consistent with CDC recommendations at the time. Serum
samples were tested for anti–SARS-CoV serum antibodies
by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and
indirect fluorescent antibody test (9).
Data were entered into Microsoft Access and statistical
analysis was performed with SAS version 8.2 (SAS
Institute, Cary, NC). Univariate analysis was performed by
using two-sided Fisher exact or Mantel-Haenszel chi-
squared test, as appropriate. A p value of <0.05 was con-
sidered significant. 
Results
Eight of the nine United States healthcare facilities in
which SARS-CoV–infected patients were evaluated par-
ticipated in the investigation. Six of the eight SARS-
CoV–positive patients visited or were hospitalized at these
eight facilities. A total of 110 healthcare workers (range
4–36 healthcare workers per healthcare facility) participat-
ed in this follow-up investigation (Table 1). This total rep-
resented approximately 85% of healthcare workers who
were identified as being at high risk for infection.
Healthcare workers were exposed to these patients from
March 15 to June 23, 2003.
The median age of healthcare workers was 41 years
(range 23–61), 75% were females, and 74% were
Caucasian (Table 2). The most common occupation was
nursing staff (48%), and the most common work site was
the medical ward (38%), followed by the emergency
department (24%) (Table 2). Preexisting medical condi-
tions in the healthcare workers were infrequent (data not
shown).
Each healthcare worker was exposed over a median of
2.0 days (range 1–14), during which a median of 3.0 inter-
actions (range 1–50) with the SARS patient occurred. Of
the 102 healthcare workers from whom complete data
were available, 45 (44%) reported exposure without any
type of mask; 72 (70%) had exposure without eye protec-
tion (Table 3). 
Sixty-six healthcare workers (65%) reported that the
patient was coughing during one or more patient-worker
interactions. Of these, 40% had at least one exposure with-
out a respirator and 52% had at least one without gown,
gloves, and eye protection. Eleven (11%) reported interac-
tion with a patient who had active diarrhea, and 1 (1%)
reported exposure during patient vomiting (Table 4).
Healthcare procedures with high potential to generate
droplets and aerosols were infrequent: 5 healthcare work-
ers (5%) reported manipulating an airway, (i.e., performing
endotracheal intubation or suctioning), and 4 (4%) report-
ed being present during administration of aerosolized med-
ications (Table 4).
Three healthcare facilities instituted full infection-
control precautions (i.e., full use of personal protective
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Table 1. Characteristics of SARS patient healthcare in participating U.S. healthcare facilities
a 
HCF  SARS patient  Date
b  Date full IC
c started  Patient-days in HCF  Participating HCWs 
1  A  3/15/03  3/15/03  10  36 
2  B  3/2/03  Not started  15  7 
3  C  3/14/03  3/16/03  8  16 
4  D  3/20/03  3/20/03  8  7 
5  E  4/6/03  Not started  1  4 
6  E  4/10/03  Not started  1  7 
7  E  4/14/03  4/14/03  7  21 
8  F  5/27/03  Not started  4  12 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; HCF, healthcare facility; IC, infection control; HCWs, healthcare workers. 
bDate, refers to the first date of the visit at the healthcare facility. This may be the date of admission or the date of visit to an outpatient clinic, emergency room, 
laboratory, or radiology suite. 
cFull infection control consists of negative-pressure isolation, N95 or higher respirator, gown, gloves, and eye protection. 
Table 2. Demographic characteristics, occupation, and location 
of participating HCWs exposed to laboratory-confirmed SARS 
patients (n = 110)
a 
Characteristic  n (%) 
Median age  41 (range 23–61) 
Female gender  82 (75) 
Caucasian  81 (74) 
Nursing staff
b  53 (48) 
Technicians
c  23 (21) 
Medical staff
d  16 (15) 
Other occupation  18 (16) 
Medical ward  41 (38) 
Emergency department  26 (24) 
Outpatient clinic  16 (15) 
Intensive care unit  7 (6) 
Other location  20 (18) 
aHCWs, healthcare workers; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
bNursing staff, registered nurses, licensed practicing nurses, nurses aides, patient 
care technician. 
cTechnicians, respiratory therapist, phlebotomist, radiology technician. 
dMedical staff, residents, fellows, attending physician, physician assistants. 
 equipment and placement in an isolation room) on the first
day the patient was seen. Healthcare workers in these facil-
ities reported significantly fewer unprotected exposures, in
comparison to facilities where full SARS precautions were
not instituted on the first day (62% vs. 87%, p < 0.05).
To assess adherence to infection-control practices, we
identified healthcare workers who had all of their expo-
sures only after full SARS precautions were started. We
identified 43 such workers, representing all of the health-
care facilities that instituted precautions. In these workers,
lapses in infection control still occurred, with nearly half
reporting unprotected exposures, including many with no
eye protection (Table 5).
Clinical signs or symptoms developed in 17 healthcare
workers (15%) after exposure to one of the laboratory-con-
firmed SARS patients, most commonly cough (Table 6).
Convalescent-phase serum samples were available for 103
(94%) healthcare workers; none (0%) tested positive for
SARS-CoV.
During the outbreak, CDC recommended furlough for
any exposed healthcare worker in whom symptoms devel-
oped within 10 days of last exposure. Fifteen healthcare
workers in this review (14%) were excluded from all or
selected duties as a result of SARS exposure. Of these,
seven reported symptoms (fever, respiratory symptoms, or
radiographically confirmed pneumonia), and eight were
asymptomatic. However, 10 symptomatic healthcare
workers were not excluded from duty, including four nurs-
es or nurses’ aides and one physician.
Discussion
While healthcare-related outbreaks of SARS forced
hospital closings and mandatory quarantines in some
countries, no such events were reported in the United
States. Our investigation demonstrates that although many
U.S. healthcare workers had unprotected exposures, no
documented transmission of SARS-CoV was found. In
light of the numerous healthcare workers in our investiga-
tion with unprotected droplet-range exposures, lack of
transmission in U.S. hospitals may have resulted from a
relative absence of highly infectious patients or high-risk
patient procedures. 
The mode of transmission of SARS is unclear, but evi-
dence suggests it may be spread by large- and medium-
sized droplets spread within 3 feet (5,10). Some studies
show use of any mask was associated with lower odds of
infection in healthcare-related clusters (10).
Globally, outbreaks among healthcare workers have
occurred after exposure to certain patients or at certain
points during illness (3,10–12). For example, in Singapore,
five patients were identified early in the epidemic who had
infected >10 contacts each (11). The timing of exposure to
ill patients also is critical; patients may be most infectious
in the second week of illness, as some data suggest peak
viral shedding occurs at day 10 (13). Additionally, descrip-
tive data suggest that severely ill patients may spread virus
more efficiently, particularly if they are coughing or vomit-
ing (12). Although coughing was frequently reported, vom-
iting was infrequent. In addition, patients seen in the United
States, with the exception of one patient who required intu-
bation, were generally not very ill.
Transmission may also be event-dependent. Procedures
such as intubations and medication nebulizers have been
associated with healthcare-related outbreaks, even among
protected healthcare workers (11,12). One such cluster
occurred in Toronto, where illness consistent with suspect-
ed or probable SARS developed in nine healthcare work-
ers who cared for a patient around the time of intubation,
despite use of full personal protective equipment (12). In
the United States, potential droplet- and aerosol-generating
procedures were infrequent: only one patient required
mechanical ventilation, and few healthcare workers report-
ed administering aerosolized medication or performing
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Table 3. Personal protective equipment use in HCWs reporting 
droplet-range exposure (within 3 feet) to a laboratory-confirmed 
SARS patient (n = 102)
a 
Non-use of personal protective equipment  n (%) 
Without any mask  45 (44) 
Without N95 or higher respirator  49 (48) 
Without eye protection  72 (70) 
Direct contact without gloves  40 (39)  
aHCWs, healthcare workers; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
Table 4. Healthcare workers reporting exposure to a laboratory-
confirmed SARS patient according to patient events, healthcare 
procedures, and concurrent use of personal protective 
equipment (n = 102)
a 






gloves, and eye 
protection (%) 
Coughing  66  27 (40)  34 (52) 
Diarrhea  11  4 (36)  6 (55) 
Airway manipulation  5  NA  NA 
Aerosolized medication  4  1 (25)  1 (25) 
Resuscitation  1  NA  NA 
Bronchoscopy  1  0 (0)  0 (0) 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; HCWs, healthcare workers; 
NA, not available due to incomplete reporting. 
Table 5. Unprotected exposures in healthcare workers exposed 
to laboratory-confirmed SARS patients after full infection-control 
procedures were initiated (n = 43)
a 
Exposure type  n (%) 
Any unprotected exposure  21 (49) 
Without eye protection  18 (42) 
Without N95 or higher respirator  6 (14) 
Direct contact without gloves  6 (14) 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
 bronchoscopy. One notable exception was a worker who
performed two endotracheal intubations before SARS was
diagnosed. However, despite wearing only an N95 mask
and gloves, this healthcare worker did not become symp-
tomatic or seroconvert.
Our study was subject to a number of limitations. First,
enrollment of both healthcare facilities and healthcare
workers was incomplete. One institution in which health-
care workers were exposed to two SARS-CoV–positive
patients was not included. Active surveillance performed
by state and local public health officials, as well as hospi-
tal infection-control practitioners, identified no sympto-
matic healthcare workers among the exposed (J.
Rosenberg, pers. comm.). Also, completeness of recruiting
varied between institutions, although we had a high partic-
ipation rate overall of approximately 85% of healthcare
workers identified as being at high risk.
As in all surveys, recall bias was a concern. However,
given that no healthcare workers were SARS-CoV–posi-
tive and few had symptoms, the effect of outcome on recall
was probably minimal. Additionally, questions about hand
hygiene and removal of personal protective equipment
were not included because of concerns of overwhelming
bias inherent in recalling such practices, although these
factors may have been important. 
Third, although most serum samples were obtained >28
days after last exposure to the SARS patient, 19 (18%)
samples were obtained during days 22 to 28. These sam-
ples were primarily collected early in the outbreak when
the recommendation for convalescent-phase serum collec-
tion was set for >21 days after exposure. Evidence from
other studies shows that most case-patients case will sero-
convert by day 20 (13). Although this ELISA is currently
used as a standard criterion and has unknown sensitivity, a
similar assay has been reported to have an estimated sensi-
tivity of approximately 93%, based on clinical case defini-
tions for probable SARS (13).
Despite the limitations of the study, a number of
insights were gained from this analysis that may help pre-
pare public health officials and clinicians for a reappear-
ance of SARS, should it occur, or for the emergence of
another infectious disease. Rapid identification and isola-
tion of potentially infectious persons undoubtedly will
help minimize exposures. Communication between public
health officials and hospital infection control staff can help
with efficient implementation of such control procedures. 
However, current levels of adherence to infection-
control practices in the United States may not be sufficient
if many high-risk patients or procedures are encountered.
Unprotected exposures among healthcare workers may
still occur despite implementation of facilitywide infec-
tion-control precautions. Therefore, new initiatives for
infection control should include measures to improve com-
pliance with personal protective equipment overall, in
addition to specifically focusing on patients and events that
have the highest risk for transmission. 
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